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TOURO LAW REVIEW
while on the witness stand and was reluctant to answer questions
regarding the incident. Furthermore, the child stated he did not
like being in the courtroom and was frightened by all of the peo-
ple present in the courtroom. Lastly, the court noted that the
child held on to his grandmother. Based on these observations,
the trial court ordered, over defendant's objection, that the child
be permitted to testify by two-way closed-circuit television. 106
On appeal, the appellate court held that the defendant's con-
frontation rights under both the state and federal constitutions
were violated. 10 7 The court relied on People v. Cintron,108
holding that the trial judge's determination of the child's
vulnerability based upon its own observations failed to satisfy the
clear and convincing evidence standard as required by article
65.109 Similar to Cintron, the court found that the defendant's
confrontation rights were unconstitutionally abridged because the
trial court failed to call any witnesses who could provide legal
evidence that the child would likely suffer extreme mental or
emotional harm if called upon to testify in the presence of the
defendant. Since the state failed to properly demonstrate that the
child was in need of article 65110 protection, the appellate court
reversed the defendant's conviction. 111
People v. Guce1 12
(decided August 27, 1990)
The defendant, convicted of first degree rape, first degree
sodomy, first degree sexual abuse, incest, and endangering the
welfare of a child, contended that his right to confront witnesses,
as guaranteed under the state113 and federal1 14 constitutions, was
106. Costa, 160 A.D.2d at 889, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
107. Id. at 890, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
108. 75 N.Y.2d 249, 551 N.E.2d 561, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1990).
109. Costa, 160 A.D.2d at 890, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
110. N.Y. CiM. PROC. LAW § 65.10 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
111. Costa, 160 A.D.2d at 890, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 931. For a discussion of
the federal law on this issue, see supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
112. 164 A.D.2d 946, 560 N.Y.S.2d 53 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 76
N.Y.2d 986, 565 N.E.2d 524, 563 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1990).
113. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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violated when the trial judge permitted two child witnesses to
testify by use of a two-way closed-circuit television. On appeal,
the appellate court held that the trial court's decision to allow the
complaining child witnesses to testify by the use of the two-way
closed-circuit television did not violate the defendant's con-
frontation rights protected under either the state or federal consti-
tution. 115 Pursuant to article 65 of the state's Criminal Procedure
Law, a trial judge can permit such testimony if it is determined:
by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely, as a result of
extraordinary circumstances, that such child witness will suffer
severe mental or emotional harm if required to testify in a
criminal proceeding without the use of live, two-way closed-
circuit and that the use of such . . . [television procedure] will
help prevent, or diminish the likelihood or extent of, such
harm.l 1
6
Prior to defendant's trial, the prosecution moved, pursuant to
section 65.20(1), 117 to hold a separate hearing to allow the trial
judge to determine whether two of the three children, allegedly
victimized by the defendant, were vulnerable witnesses and to
decide whether they can testify from a testimonial room by use of
a closed-circuit television. 118 The motion for a pre-trial hearing
was granted by the trial judge. 119
At this hearing, a certified social worker, who specializes in
working with sexually abused children, testified that it was likely
that the children would suffer severe mental or emotional harm if
required to testify in a courtroom and in the presence of the de-
fendant. The expert noted that several circumstances were present
that comport with the "extraordinary circumstances" requirement
of article 65.120 The expert added that the children experienced
114. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
115. Guce, 164 A.D.2d at 946, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
116. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAv § 65.10(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990).
117. For a discussion of article 65 see supra notes 39-52 and accompanying
text.
118. Guce, 164 A.D.2d at 946, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
119. Id. (citing N.Y. CIRa. PROc. LAW § 65.20(11) (McKinney 1982 &
Supp. 1990)).
120. To comply with the extraordinary circumstances requirement of article
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severe mental and emotional harm from knowing that they were
going to hurt their father and be responsible for the break up of
their family. Lastly, the expert testified that the children would
also suffer psychological harm if required to testify in a court-
room and in the presence of the defendant. Based on this testi-
mony, the trial judge declared that both children were vulnerable
witnesses and should be permitted to testify by use of a two-way
closed-circuit television.
In a memorandum opinion, the appellate court rejected the de-
fendant's contention that his right to confront his witnesses was
absolute. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court
decision, in Maryland v. Craig,121 recently decided that a
criminal defendant's confrontation rights could be constitutionally
infringed upon if the state establishes, by case-specific facts, that
allowing the child witness to testify by closed-circuit television
would protect him or her from the trauma of testifying in
court. 122 The court noted that since the New York statute offered
65, the court need only make "a finding that any one or more of the [twelve]
factors have been established by clear and convincing evidence ... " N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAw § 65.20(9) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990).
In this case, the appellate court found five factors that were established by
clear and convincing evidence: 1) the crimes committed were particularly
heinous in degree, see id. § 65.20(9)(a); 2) the victimized children were
particularly young, see id. § 65.20(9)(b); 3) the defendant, their father, was an
authority figure, see id. § 65.20(9)(c); 4) the mother threatened the children
that they would be responsible for breaking up the family if they testified
against their father, see id. § 65.20(9)(h); and 5) the children felt abandoned
by both their mother and father and would be susceptible to psychological
harm if testifying in the presence of the defendant, see id. §§ 65.20(9), (12).
121. 110 S. Ct. 3137 (1990).
122. Guce, 164 A.D.2d at 947, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 55 (citing Maryland v.
Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990)). In Craig, the United States Supreme Court
held that:
if the State makes an adequate showing of necessity, the state interest in
protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse
case is sufficiently important to justify the use of a [one-way closed
circuit television] that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at
trial against a defendant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation
with the defendant.
Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169. However, the state must establish a case-specific
finding of necessity. Id. The court in Guce stated that "[t]his is precisely what
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the criminal defendant greater protection than the statute
challenged in Craig, it followed that the former should withstand
a facial constitutional challenge.
Turning to the case at bar, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's assessment that the expert witness established, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the children would likely suffer se-
vere mental and emotional harm if forced to testify in court and
in the presence of the defendant. The court noted that the expert's
testimony showed that these particular children would suffer such
harm based on the extraordinary circumstances present in this
case, as opposed to a more generalized reluctance or fear of testi-
fying in front of their father.123 By offering clear and convincing
evidence of extraordinary circumstances, the appellate court
found "that there [was an] individualized showing of necessity in
this case warranting... the minimum infringement of the defen-
dant's confrontation rights." 124
CPL article 65 requires." Guce, 164 A.D.2d at 947, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 55; see
N.Y. CR i. PRoc. LAwv § 65.00 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990).
123. Guce, 164 A.D.2d at 948, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 56. The appellate court
also noted that this case was factually distinguishable from People v.
Henderson, 156 A.D.2d 92, 554 N.Y.S.2d 924 (2d Dep't 1990).
In Henderson, the court held that the defendant's right to confrontation,
under both the state and federal constitutions, was violated when the court
permitted sexually abused children to testify by the use of two-way closed-
circuit television. Henderson, 156 A.D.2d at 102, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 929. The
court also stated that the expert witness failed to offer any particular testimony
as to whether the child would suffer severe mental or emotional harm if forced
to testify in court and in the presence of the defendant. Id. at 99, 554
N.Y.S.2d at 928.
124. Guce, 164 A.D.2d at 949, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 56-57 (citing Maryland v.
Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990); People v. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d 249, 551
N.E.2d 561, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1990); People v. Henderson, 156 A.D.2d 92,
554 N.Y.S.2d 924 (2d Dep't 1990)).
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